A ‘Grand Bargain’ With Iran?

This article thinks it can be done. Key quote:

The next U.S. president, whether it is John McCain or Barack Obama, should reorient American policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran as fundamentally as President Nixon reoriented American policy toward the People’s Republic of China in the early 1970s. Nearly three decades of U.S. policy toward Iran emphasizing diplomatic isolation, escalating economic pressure, and thinly veiled support for regime change have damaged the interests of the United States and its allies in the Middle East. U.S.-Iranian tensions have been a constant source of regional instability and are an increasingly dangerous risk factor for global energy security. As a result of a dysfunctional Iran policy, among other foreign policy blunders, the American position in the region is currently under greater strain than at any point since the end of the Cold War.

Iran’s regime certainly poses a significant problem for the world’s stability, but I’m not sure that our policies since the revolution in 1979 have done anything to change this (in fact, they have most likely exacerbated Iranian belligerence in recent years). I think the above article shows several promising tracks on which we could pursue a new formula of dialogue with our erstwhile foe. One of the most obvious ways of strategic common ground with Iran (and something we actually tried in the aftermath of 9/11 with significant success) is our shared interest in preventing the Taliban from re-emerging in Afghanistan. Iran may be an Islamic theocracy, but as a predominantly Shi’a country with a historically bitter rivalry with Sunni extremism (i.e. the Taliban and al-Qaeda), it seems highly misguided that we wouldn’t desire to exploit this useful connection (especially in light of the fact that our current ally against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the region, Pakistan, has for 7 years been funneling our billions in anti-terror aid money to the very same people we’re supposed to be fighting!).

The idea from Flynt Leverett of a ‘grand bargain’ with Iran may well be unworkable, but I’m not sure we lose anything by trying. If anything, we demonstrate to the Iranian people a willingness to find a reasonable solution to our current impasse. Symbolism on this front is no unimportant thing. An Iranian populace that sees a friendly America will be a thorn in the side of the Mullahs, whose populist agenda is only sustainable with a ‘Great Satan’ to mobilize against. Take out the pretext, and I think the Iranian regime’s raison d’etre loses significant traction amongst the people.

If, on the other hand, they don’t go for our olive branch or otherwise renege on commitments made in a ‘grand bargain’, then we achieve a resurgent credibilty amongst our Allies and even in the region; that we actually tried a good-faith approach to finding a kind of rapproachment should not be dismissed as foreign policy naivete. In reality, switching toward a more overt peace track is a far more shrewd strategic option. It either works and we find ourselves in diplomatic concert with Iran, or it fails and we find ourselves in a position of hitherto dominant leverage vis a vis Iran. It’s worth a shot.